Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives, and Bad Faith in Eminent Domain Law by Oswald, Lynda J
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 1 Article 3
1-1-2008
Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes,
Improper Motives, and Bad Faith in Eminent
Domain Law
Lynda J. Oswald
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Land Use Planning Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses: Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives, and Bad Faith in
Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 45 (2008), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/
vol35/iss1/3
45 
PUBLIC USES AND NON-USES: SINISTER 
SCHEMES, IMPROPER MOTIVES, AND BAD 
FAITH IN EMINENT DOMAIN LAW 
Lynda J. Oswald* 
Abstract: This Article addresses the largely unexplored issue of whether a 
sovereign may use its power of eminent domain not to pursue an affirma-
tive public use, but rather to prevent an undesired private use (such as a 
landfill, rehabilitation facility, or other NIMBY-triggering use) from going 
forward. The author argues that although sovereigns tend to dissemble in 
these non-use cases based upon an underlying assumption by condem-
nors and courts alike that non-use takings are not constitutionally permit-
ted, their analysis is in fact, incorrect. It is not the non-use condemnations 
themselves that are problematic, but the subterfuge that condemnors 
typically use in pursuing such takings. The resulting lack of transparency 
in governmental action subverts the political process and weakens private 
property rights protection. 
Introduction 
 Imagine that you are a retired farmer, with several hundred acres 
of agricultural land, and that neither you nor your family has any con-
tinued interest in farming it. You have been approached by a national 
real estate development firm that wishes to build a large “New Urban-
ism” mixed-use community on your property, consisting of thousands 
of homes intermixed with retail and office uses. Although the project 
would require a rezoning, the proposed uses are not inconsistent with 
your municipality’s master plan and the development firm anticipates 
that the project would be approved by the local planning commission, 
subject only to typical land use controls. 
 Your neighbors are horrified at the proposal and quickly organize 
to oppose the project. Soon thereafter, your municipal government 
announces that it intends to condemn your property for use in part as a 
public park, but primarily for an open space/wildlife preserve. The 
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municipal officials propose a special tax to pay for the condemnation, 
which the residents approve in a special election. 
 You find the condemnation highly suspect, as the municipality 
has never before expressed a desire or need for a public park or open 
space in this location or of this size. Although the municipality has 
offered you just compensation for your property, you and the devel-
opment firm you were negotiating with wish to challenge the con-
demnation of the property in court as not meeting the public use re-
quirement of the state and federal constitutions. Your argument is 
that the municipality is not really pursuing a public use—a park and 
provision of open space—through condemnation of your property, 
but rather is condemning to prevent a private, lawful use that it op-
poses from going forward. Will your legal challenge succeed? 
 Various permutations of this scenario have played out in recent 
years in published court cases. We can only speculate as to how often 
the situation has occurred, but has not resulted in a court challenge 
and subsequent published opinion. Moreover, the number of times 
that this condemnation strategy has been proposed and seriously con-
sidered but not pursued because of budgetary or other concerns is, 
undoubtedly, much higher still.1 The scenario raises a fascinating, 
though largely unexplored, question regarding the scope of the pub-
lic use requirement of the Takings Clause: may a sovereign use its 
power of eminent domain not to pursue an affirmative public use, but 
rather to prevent an undesired private use from going forward? In 
short, may a sovereign exercise its eminent domain power to pursue a 
non-use? 
 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”2 Most recent legal scholarship on the scope of the public use 
                                                                                                                      
1 Anecdotal evidence derived from my own experience of serving on a local planning 
commission for fifteen years suggests that it is a strategy often urged by disaffected 
neighbors, who may well not comprehend either the fiscal or legal issues posed by such a 
tactic, but who view it as an efficient and quick solution to often hostile and emotion-laden 
conflicts between neighboring land uses. 
2 U.S. Const. amend. V. The U.S. Supreme Court extended this amendment to the 
states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1896. See Chi., Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). In addition, virtually all 
state constitutions contain similar clauses. See 2A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain § 7.01[1] & n.10 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Nichols] (listing state statutory 
and constitutional provisions). 
As noted by the Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, state takings clauses may 
be significantly more restrictive than the federal clause: “[M]any States already impose 
‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these re-
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requirement has tended to focus on the thorny question of whether a 
sovereign can condemn private property for redevelopment by an-
other private party,3 a question that the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed recently in Kelo v. City of New London.4 
 I address the flip side of the eminent domain coin. In the non-use 
context, the condemning authority condemns to prevent an undesir-
able use—or, at least, one undesired by the condemnor or its most vo-
cal constituents—be it a landfill,5 low-income housing,6 a rehabilitation 
facility,7 or any other NIMBY-triggering use.8 Rather than attempting to 
prevent the undesired use through a noncompensable exercise of its 
police power—an attempt that might prove illegal, resulting in a regu-
latory taking9—the sovereign elects instead to condemn the property 
and pay the constitutionally mandated just compensation for the prop-
erty taken.10 But is such an action constitutional? Does it satisfy the pub-
lic use requirement of the Fifth Amendment? 
 Although public use itself is a difficult concept for courts to wrest 
with, the non-use cases seem to pose even tougher analytical hurdles 
for the courts. As a result, the line of published cases on this topic are 
either limited in their analysis, or simply wrongly decided. 
                                                                                                                      
quirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others are 
expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which 
takings may be exercised.” 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
3 See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Ar-
gument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 491, 500–23 
(2006); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public Use” as a 
Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 54 Drake 
L. Rev. 171, 188–200 (2005); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. 
St. L. Rev. 859, 859–61 (2004); Brent Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, From Public Use to Public 
Purpose: The Supreme Court Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 
Gonz. L. Rev. 81, 96–98 (2005–06). 
4 See generally 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (discussed infra notes 33–44 and accompanying 
text). 
5 See Earth Mgmt., Inc. v. Heard County, 283 S.E.2d 455, 456–57 (Ga. 1981) (discussed 
infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text). 
6 See Pheasant Ridge Assocs. v. Town of Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Mass. 
1987) (discussed infra notes 73–82 and accompanying text); Town of Chelmsford v. DiBi-
ase, 345 N.E.2d 373, 373–74 (Mass. 1976) (discussed infra note 81). 
7 See Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Inst. for Rehab., Inc., 673 A.2d 856, 858 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995) (discussed infra notes 106–130 and accompanying text). 
8 NIMBY is the acronym for “not in my backyard,” signaling the propensity of land-
owners to resist having uses they perceive as noxious or intrusive located near their prop-
erty. 
9 See infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text (discussing the police power). 
10 See infra Part I (discussing the eminent domain power). 
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 I believe that the major cause of the analytical muddle surround-
ing this area is the fact that condemnors and courts alike misunder-
stand the scope and extent of the condemnors’ power to condemn. 
Both condemnors and courts seem to assume that condemnations for 
non-uses are not constitutionally permitted, so the condemnors at-
tempt to conceal their motivations in order to proceed with the con-
demnation they desire. Instead of forthrightly declaring their inten-
tions— “we don’t want a large-scale mixed-use development at this 
location in our community, so we are condemning the property to 
prevent the use” —they make a flimsy excuse for their actions— “we 
have always needed a park and open space, right here where this de-
velopment is proposed, we just hadn’t realized it until now.” Their 
dissembling is often obvious to property owners, citizens, and the 
courts alike and leads to suspicion that something not only dishonest, 
but quite likely illegal, is really going on. 
 Sometimes, of course, the municipal officials are right in think-
ing that the condemnation they desire is illegal. For example, the 
municipality may lack statutory authority to condemn for other than 
very specific purposes,11 or its actions may be unconstitutional as a 
violation of equal protection.12 In such instances, the municipality 
does indeed lack the power to do directly what it is indirectly attempt-
ing to do through its eminent domain power, and the courts are cor-
rect to call the municipality on its illegitimate action. 
 In many instances, however, the municipality’s authority is not 
constrained in this manner. It is those instances that interest me here. 
We must step back and ask why municipal officials feel a need to dis-
semble in these non-use cases, rather than being forthright about 
their intentions and motivations. Why do they think that condemning 
for non-uses is not permitted, and are they correct in their belief? 
                                                                                                                      
11 If the purpose of the taking is outside the constraints of the enabling legislation au-
thorizing the exercise of the eminent domain power by the municipality, the condemna-
tion is ultra vires and will be struck down. In Wilmington Parking Authority v. 227 West 8th 
Street, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court found that a parking authority lacked the 
power to condemn certain land pursuant to its statutory authority to exercise eminent 
domain because the primary purpose of the condemnation was to retain a business within 
the city limits, not to provide public parking, and such a purpose was outside the parking 
authority’s delegated powers. 521 A.2d 227, 230–31 (Del. 1986); see also infra note 21 (dis-
cussing City of Tempe v. Fleming, 815 P.2d 1, 4–5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)). 
12 See Gazzola v. Clements, 411 A.2d 147, 152 (N.H. 1980) (finding a lack of equal pro-
tection under the state constitution when a citizen was denied a hearing where the state 
sought condemnation to build a park, but others were given a hearing where the state 
sought to condemn for highway construction). 
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 I argue that—particularly in light of the recent decision in Kelo, in 
which the Supreme Court essentially stated that public uses equal pub-
lic purposes, which equal practically anything the legislature defines as 
such13—municipalities actually do have the constitutional power to en-
gage in condemnations for non-uses. Prevention of an undesired use is, 
in effect, a form of public use, and the sovereign should be able to use 
eminent domain as yet one more tool in its regulatory toolbox, pro-
vided that: (1) it is willing to pay the just compensation price tag; and 
(2) it is prepared to show that the condemnation is motivated by an 
actual public use (which would include prevention of a private use 
deemed detrimental to the public as a whole), as opposed to an intent 
to benefit private parties (such as protection of one or a few vocal 
neighbors). 
 The real problem is not that municipalities engage in condemna-
tions for non-uses, but that they employ subterfuge to do so. It is the 
lack of transparency in governmental action, not the action itself, that 
renders the taking suspect and perhaps even void. If a municipality 
were simply honest about what it was doing— “we are condemning to 
prevent this large development from being built” —the rights of all 
concerned would be better protected. The property owner would ob-
tain just compensation for its property. (It may still resent the condem-
nation and prefer the ownership of the land to the monetary compen-
sation, but that can be true of any condemnation, not just those 
involving non-uses.) More importantly, the public would be fully in-
formed as to the nature of the municipality’s action and, to the extent 
that the public opposed the municipality’s condemnation, the political 
process could address those decisions contrary to public will through 
referenda, recalls, or other ballot-box measures. The Constitution is not 
the only protector of private property rights. The political process also 
has a critical role to play; unfortunately, the current jurisprudence on 
non-use takings encourages a subversion of that process. 
I. Distinguishing the Eminent Domain Power  
from the Police Power 
 The answer to whether a non-use can be a public use for purposes 
of the Takings Clause turns in part upon the potent distinction be-
tween the eminent domain power and the police power. The former 
permits the taking of private property for public use upon payment of 
                                                                                                                      
13 See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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just compensation; the latter permits the regulation, even value-
impairing regulation, of private property without the payment of such 
compensation.14 
 Professor Freund provided the classic definition of the distinc-
tion between these two sovereign powers over a century ago: 
 Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not 
because they become useful or necessary to the public, or be-
cause some public advantage can be gained by disregarding 
them, but because their free exercise is believed to be detri-
mental to public interests; it may be said that the state takes 
property by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, 
and under the police power because it is harmful . . . .15 
Thus, a sovereign’s police power enables it to enact regulations to 
promote the public health, safety, and welfare, or to prevent a public 
harm.16 Legitimate uses of the police power require no payment of 
compensation by the condemning authority; it is only when the exer-
cise of the police power goes “too far,” resulting in a regulatory tak-
ing, that compensation is required.17 
 One might think that an exercise of the eminent domain power is, 
at least in some ways, less burdensome and costly to the affected land-
owner than the exercise of the police power—after all, with the former 
the property owner receives monetary compensation equivalent to the 
property value it has lost, but with the latter it does not. This less-
burdensome result would suggest then that a municipality should al-
ways be able to choose to exercise the eminent domain power instead 
of the police power. 
 The property owner may well disagree with this trade-off, how-
ever. First, the exercises of the two powers have very different effects. 
An eminent domain action strips the property owner of its ownership 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights 
§ 511, at 546–47 (1904). 
15 Id. 
16 See Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 316–18 (1907) (“[The police power] is not con-
fined . . . to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary. It extends to so 
dealing with the conditions which exist in the State as to bring out of them the greatest 
welfare of its people.”). 
17 The Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that “[t]he general rule 
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking.” 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Since then, of course, the 
courts have struggled to decide how far is “too far.” See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering 
the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 
Wash. L. Rev. 91 (1995) (discussing the Court’s tests for regulatory takings). 
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interests, while a police power action merely constrains the property 
owner’s ability to use the property for certain purposes or in certain 
manners; the underlying property interest, and all the rights atten-
dant upon that property ownership, are left with the property owner. 
 Second, and more importantly, the exercises of the two powers 
have very different predicates. An exercise of the police power must be 
justified either by reference to the harmful nature of the proposed use 
at issue or by the promotion of the public welfare to be achieved.18 The 
eminent domain power, on the other hand, must be supported by a 
public use (though just how real this constraint is under modern juris-
prudence is a matter of some debate, as discussed in the next Part).19 If 
the public use requirement of the Eminent Domain Clause can be satis-
fied by the mere desire of municipal officials to avoid an unwanted, but 
otherwise legitimate use, then the property owner may correctly view 
his rights to be at greater risk. The police power requirement that the 
municipality justify its restrictions, define their extent, and otherwise 
leave the property owner in possession of, and free to use, his property 
may be preferable to the cold comfort of knowing that the owner will 
be fully compensated for the property he has lost under the eminent 
domain power. 
 If the mixed-use development proposed in the hypothetical 
above were to actually pose harm to the public, the municipality 
would not have to resort to eminent domain, and the concomitant 
requirement of just compensation, in order to regulate and prevent 
the harm. Instead, it could do so directly through its police power, 
and without payment of compensation, by passing land use regula-
tions governing the use. The difficulty lies, of course, in characteriz-
ing a particular use as either a prevention of public harm or promo-
tion of public welfare such that compensation is not required for the 
regulation.20 With regard to the hypothetical, for example, the mu-
nicipality could clearly exercise its police power to regulate the loca-
tion of the development and its infrastructure so as to prevent con-
flicts with neighboring uses or threats to resources such as public 
water supplies or to regulate the placement of roads, type of signage 
and lighting, and other aspects of the development that might create 
a public or private nuisance. It is conceivable that the municipality 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the “Harm/Benefit” and “Average Reciprocity of Advan-
tage” Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1449, 1459–64 (1997) (dis-
cussing bases for exercise of the police power). 
19 See infra Part II. 
20 See Oswald, supra note 18, at 1478–81, 1485–89. 
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could even ban the land use altogether (if, for example, the public 
need for these uses was already being met in nearby communities or if 
the municipality lacked adequate water or sewer infrastructure to 
support such an activity). Outright bans on such uses are likely to be 
viewed with a close and skeptical judicial eye, however, and such exer-
cises of the police power may not survive a legal challenge. The police 
power therefore might well support the imposition of restrictions 
upon the proposed use, but perhaps not its ban altogether. 
 It is in this context that the question posed by the non-use cases 
arises: when the use proposed by the property owner is perfectly legal 
and is likely insulated from police power regulation banning such use, 
can a municipality turn to eminent domain as an alternative? Is the 
payment of just compensation the only key needed to open the emi-
nent domain door? Or does the public use requirement impose real 
constraints on the use of eminent domain as a regulatory tool to pre-
vent non-desired uses?21 In short, can a non-use be a public use? 
II. The Public Use Requirement of the Takings Clause 
 The power of eminent domain is considered to be an inherent 
and essential attribute of sovereignty. In the words of the Supreme 
Court, “The taking of private property for public use upon just com-
pensation is so often necessary for the proper performance of gov-
ernmental functions that the power is deemed to be essential to the 
life of the State.”22 Thus, the Court has noted, the Takings Clause “is 
                                                                                                                      
21 Although the public use requirement focuses on constitutional bars to exercise of 
the eminent domain power, statutory bars may exist as well. The municipality may lack 
authority to condemn, depending upon the underlying enabling legislation. In such an 
instance, the municipality’s only option is to exercise its police power, assuming, of course, 
that the situation lends itself to a legitimate exercise of the police power. In City of Tempe v. 
Fleming, for example, the city convicted a property owner of maintaining a public nuisance 
because his property contained extensive trash. 815 P.2d 1, 2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). The 
city then sought to obtain title to the property through eminent domain so that it could 
abate the nuisance. Id. The court noted that the state statute authorized a municipality to 
exercise the eminent domain power for only limited purposes, and that none of these 
purposes included abatement of a nuisance, but that the state did allow the city to abate a 
nuisance by use of its police power. Id. at 4–5. The city had argued that it should be able to 
avoid the “harsh result” of using its police power to abate the nuisance by taking the prop-
erty through eminent domain and offering just compensation. Id. The court rejected the 
argument, stating that “[t]he regulation and abatement of a nuisance is one of the ordi-
nary functions of the police power.” Id. at 5. But, the court went on to state, “The exercise 
of the police power does not include the power of eminent domain.” Id. “Eminent domain 
proceedings are not a substitute for judicial foreclosure of a lien created pursuant to [a 
state statute].” Id. 
22 Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924). 
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designed not to limit the governmental interference with property 
rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise 
proper interference amounting to a taking.”23 The “otherwise proper 
interference” language is critical here. The eminent domain power is 
not without limits. If the government action fails to satisfy the public 
use requirement, or is so arbitrary as to be a violation of due process, 
then the taking is invalid and “[n]o amount of compensation can au-
thorize such action.”24 
 Historically, public use has been an amorphous concept, resistant 
to precise definition.25 The state courts, in particular, have diverged 
on how they treat the term. In the narrow (and more literal) view of 
the concept, public use is considered to be synonymous with employ-
ment, meaning that the condemned property must be employed only 
for projects where the public can use the property acquired—a defini-
tion that constrains the state’s exercise of the condemnation power.26 
 In the broader view, public use is treated as coterminous with 
public advantage or public purpose, which allows the acquisition of 
private property to further the public good or general welfare, or to 
secure a public benefit.27 Under this view, public use is broadly de-
fined as “conducive to community prosperity,”28 which would include 
“any exercise of eminent domain which tends to enlarge resources, 
increase industrial energies, or promote the productive power of any 
considerable number of inhabitants of a state or community . . . .”29 
 At the same time, the public use to which the private property 
taken is put need not be active; rather, negative uses are permitted in 
the sense that “the prevention of an evil may constitute a public use.”30 
Normally, the courts discuss the negative public uses that prevent evil as 
being those combating “slum, blight, and economic loss.”31 I could find 
no reported case characterizing prevention of a legal but undesired 
land use as a negative public use that combats evil. 
                                                                                                                      
23 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 
(1987). 
24 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005). 
25 See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. Rev. 49, 59–61 (1999) 
(discussing the various interpretations and applications of the public use standard). 
26 See Nichols, supra note 2, § 7.02[2] (discussing the narrow view of public use). 
27 See id. § 7.01[3]. 
28 Id. § 7.02[4]. 
29 Id. § 7.02[3]. 
30 Id. § 7.02[4]; see also Crommett v. City of Portland, 107 A.2d 841, 850 (Me. 1954) 
(noting that “[t]he prevention of evil may constitute a [public] use”). 
31 Nichols, supra note 2, § 7.02[4]. 
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 The Supreme Court historically has adopted the broad view of the 
public use power.32 Its recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London reaf-
firmed this stance, although hardly unreservedly, as it was a divisive 5-4 
decision.33 The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, 
stated that “this ‘Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that 
condemned property be put into use for the general public.’”34 Instead, 
the Kelo majority turned to what it deemed the “broader and more 
natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”35 The Court 
also emphasized the “‘great respect’” that the federal courts should pay 
the state courts and legislatures in identifying local public needs,36 stat-
ing that: “‘When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means 
are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the 
wisdom of takings—no less than the debates over the wisdom of other 
kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in the 
federal courts.’”37 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (pointing 
out the “inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test [for public use]”); Fall-
brook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161–62 (1896) (finding that public use 
means furthering a public interest). 
33 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
34 Id. at 479 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)). 
35 Id. at 480. The Kelo majority had a long line of precedent to look to, in which the 
Court had repeatedly held that the judicial role in the public use inquiry was extremely 
limited. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“The role of the judiciary in 
determining whether [the eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public purpose 
is an extremely narrow one.”). The Kelo court in particular turned to Berman, where the 
Court had found that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive” enough 
to allow the use of eminent domain to achieve any legislatively permissible end. Id. at 33 
(quoted in Kelo, 545 U.S. at 481). It also relied on its 1984 decision in Midkiff, where the 
Court stated that the eminent domain power is “coterminous with the scope of a sover-
eign’s police powers” and that an exercise of eminent domain must be upheld if it “is ra-
tionally related to a conceivable public purpose.” 467 U.S. at 240–41. 
36 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482 (quoting Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606–
07 (1908)). 
37 Id. at 488 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43). As explained in Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, the leading treatise in the eminent domain law area: 
When the legislature has authorized the exercise of eminent domain in a par-
ticular case, it has necessarily adjudicated that the land to be taken is needed 
for the public use, and no other or further adjudication is necessary. When 
the legislature has made its decision and has authorized the taking of land by 
eminent domain, the owner has no constitutional right to have this decision 
reviewed in judicial proceedings or to be heard by a court on the question 
whether the public improvement for which it is taken is required by public 
necessity and convenience, or whether it is necessary or expedient that his 
land be taken for such improvement, unless the public use alleged for the 
taking is a mere pretense. 
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 In the end, Kelo provides little direct guidance for the resolution 
of the non-use situation. At issue in Kelo was whether the condemna-
tion of non-blighted private property to foster economic redevelop-
ment was a public use.38 The debate amongst the Justices was the ex-
tent to which the direct benefit derived from such a taking must flow 
through to the public as opposed to private interests.39 
 The Court’s reaffirmation of its earlier adoptions of the broad 
view of public use is illuminating, even if it does not completely re-
solve the issue of takings for non-use. Of particular relevance is the 
syllogism that the Kelo court invoked. In effect, the Kelo majority 
stated: 
Public Use 
= 
Public Purpose 
= 
Pretty Much Anything the Legislature Rationally Defines as Such 
The interesting and critical debate over whether the Court is correct 
in the deferential stance that it has taken to local legislative determi-
nations of public use, particularly in the context of economic redevel-
opment projects, has been left to another day and another forum. 
Rather, taking Kelo at face value—as the Supreme Court’s most cur-
rent word on the extent of judicial deference to legislative determina-
tions of takings and as binding law on the scope of constitutional limi-
tations on the eminent domain power—it becomes clear that non-use 
takings are not constitutionally prohibited on their face. Kelo’s hands-
off approach to public use leaves the door clearly open for takings to 
prevent undesired uses, as well as takings to achieve affirmative goals, 
                                                                                                                      
1A Nichols, supra note 2, § 4.11[1]. 
38 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472, 475. 
39 Id. at 500. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found that any public purpose 
espoused by the legislature was a sufficient public use. Id. at 483 (stating that for over a 
century, the Court’s “public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and 
intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what 
public needs justify the use of the takings power”). Justice Thomas, in his dissent, argued 
that a public use existed only when the public had the legal right to use the property after 
the taking—in effect, adopting the narrow definition of public use. See id. at 521 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he government may take property only if it actually uses or gives the 
public a legal right to use the property.”). In her dissent, Justice O’Connor took a middle 
ground, arguing for a rule that that would permit a taking of property for the benefit of a 
private party only when the taking would “directly achieve[] a public benefit.” Id. at 500 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 494. 
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provided that the legislature in good faith determines that preventing 
an undesired use would serve the public purpose and provide a public 
use. 
 That is not to say, however, that the legislature has a blank check 
with respect to takings, including non-use takings. One important les-
son of Kelo and the firestorm of public outrage that it sparked is that 
constitutional protection is by no means the only protection that pri-
vate property owners have against unbridled and/or overreaching 
legislative takings.40 The political process has a large and important 
role to play in determining whether takings go forward.41 For in-
stance, in the aftermath of Kelo, where the public outcry was immedi-
ate and vocal, the response of the state legislatures in introducing 
(and even enacting) legislation that would limit the impact of Kelo in 
state condemnation actions was swift and severe.42 
 The significance of Kelo for non-use takings lies in its two-fold 
message that: (1) legislative determinations of public use and need 
are entitled to substantial judicial deference; and (2) the political 
process, as well as the judiciary and the Constitution, has an impor-
tant role to play in reining in takings that are inappropriate or unwar-
ranted.43 However, for the proper balance of power between the judi-
ciary and the political process to emerge in the takings arena, the 
takings process itself must be open and transparent—and it is here 
that the non-use takings cases fall short. 
 The current jurisprudence on non-use takings discourages can-
did discussions of motivations and purposes by condemnors, and en-
courages instead evasive and disingenuous actions that, even if they 
do not run afoul of constitutional limitations as set forth in Kelo, 
clearly subvert the political process and dilute the power of the public 
in setting condemnation policy. To a large extent, this problem has 
been generated by the complex, confusing, and often imprecise terms 
that courts use to evaluate condemnors’ actions in takings cases. As 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Judy Coleman, The Power of a Few, the Anger of the Many, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 2005, at 
B02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/07/ 
AR2005100702335.html. 
41 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 ( “[N]othing in [this] opinion precludes any State from 
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”). 
42 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Post Kelo v. New London State Emi-
nent Domain Legislation (May 2007), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/post-keloleg. 
htm. Thirteen states have considered restrictive legislation in response to Kelo. Four states 
have enacted such legislation, and one state (Michigan) has passed a constitutional 
amendment on this issue. Id. 
43 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482–83, 489. 
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discussed in the next Part, vague notions of motive, purpose, and bad 
faith have led condemnors to dissemble, rather than to be direct and 
honest about their actions.44 
III. Motive, Purpose, and the Role of Bad Faith  
in Non-Use Cases 
 It is difficult to characterize the public use limitations of eminent 
domain actions because the rules are packed with complex and often 
conflicting notions. Even prior to Kelo v. City of New London, substantial 
judicial deference to the sovereign was the norm in condemnation ac-
tions.45 The courts historically have applied a presumption of legiti-
macy to legislative declarations of public use, which can only be over-
come where, as one treatise summarized it, “the use is clearly, plainly, 
and manifestly of a private character, or the declaration by the legisla-
ture is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable, involves an impossibility, or 
is palpably without reasonable foundation, or was induced by fraud, 
collusion, or bad faith.”46 In short, when the alleged “purpose is to 
cloak to some sinister scheme,”47 the courts can intervene to redress 
bad faith actions by the legislature.48 Short of these types of clearly un-
tenable actions, however, it would appear that almost anything goes in 
terms of legislative determinations of public uses. Moreover, while ar-
ticulating these general prohibitions regarding legislative overreaching 
in the public use arena is relatively easy, applying them in specific cases 
is much more difficult. 
 In general, in evaluating the legitimacy of a condemnation ac-
tion, the courts use a confusing, and often overlapping, array of 
terms. The courts talk of analyzing the condemnor’s actions in terms 
of purpose versus motive (the former being a legitimate focus of judi-
cial inquiry, the latter not), in terms of true versus stated purpose, 
and in terms of bad faith. None of these terms is well defined within 
the eminent domain field, however, and they are often used inter-
                                                                                                                      
44 See infra Part III. 
45 See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (“[L]egislatures are 
better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking 
power.”). 
46 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 29 (1992). 
47 Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm’n, 175 S.E.2d 805, 814 (S.C. 1970). 
48 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 29 (1992). And yet, while the courts frequently aver 
their power to set aside eminent domain actions of the legislature grounded in bad faith, 
they have actually done so in only a few cases. See id. § 28. Bad faith is discussed further 
below. See infra Part III.B. 
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changeably. The net result is that it is difficult to ascertain the true 
rules that apply to judicial evaluations of legislative decisions to con-
demn property, particularly in the non-use context. 
A. Motive Versus Purpose 
 In defining the scope of appropriate judicial scrutiny of con-
demnation actions, the courts rely heavily on the hazy distinction be-
tween motive and purpose49—while legislative motives are considered 
outside the realm of appropriate judicial inquiry, legislative purpose 
(which is viewed as a more concrete, verifiable concept) is considered 
fair game for judicial scrutiny.50 Judicial reluctance to inquire into the 
motives underlying legislative actions (of any type, not just condemna-
tions) is driven by the difficulty of assessing such motives. As the Su-
preme Court explained in an 1885 case involving allegations that San 
Francisco regulations controlling the operation of public laundries 
                                                                                                                      
49 See, e.g., City of Wentzville v. Dodson, 133 S.W.3d 543, 548 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). The 
Missouri Supreme Court recently described the difference between motive and purpose as 
follows: 
While purpose and motive are sometimes used synonymously, . . . they are dis-
tinguishable in that motive refers to “that which prompts the choice or moves 
the will thereby inciting or inducing action,” and purpose refers to “that 
which one sets before himself as the end, aim, effect, or result to be kept in 
view or object to be attained.” The purpose of a condemnation action is sub-
ject to judicial scrutiny because it is the basis on which the authority to con-
demn rests. 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting City of Kirkwood v. Venable, 173 S.W.2d 8, 12 (1943)). 
50 See, e.g., id. (“Generally, however, the purpose of a condemnation action is open to 
judicial investigation, although we cannot question the motive of such an action.”); In re 
Real Property in Inc. Vill. of Hewlett Bay Park, 265 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1966) (“[W]hen dealing with a legislative determination to condemn, it becomes espe-
cially important to scrutinize the purpose, for a proper purpose is the very essence of the 
right to condemn.”), rev’d sub nom., Inc. Vill. of Hewlett Bay Park v. Klein, 276 N.Y.S.2d 312 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1966). 
The purpose/motive distinction is blurred by the tendency of at least some courts to 
analyze purpose in terms of motivation. See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 105 
A.2d 614, 626 (Del. 1954) (“[T]he reviewing court must be satisfied that the underlying 
purpose—the motivating desire—of the public authority is the benefit to the general pub-
lic.”). According to the Delaware Supreme Court: “This test instructs the trier of fact to 
examine the motivations of the parking authority and the objective benefits that accrue to 
the general public versus private interests.” Wilmington Parking Auth. v. 227 W. 8th St., 
521 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 1987) (affirming trial court’s finding that the primary motivation 
behind the condemnation was to benefit the city by retaining a business, not to provide 
public parking, and that the proposed condemnation was, therefore, beyond the parking 
authority’s statutory condemnation power). 
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were improperly motivated by a discriminatory animus against Chi-
nese persons: 
[T]he rule is general with reference to the enactments of all 
legislative bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the mo-
tives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may be 
disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferrible [sic] from their 
operation, considered with reference to the condition of the 
country and existing legislation. The motives of the legisla-
tors, considered as the purposes they had in view, will always 
be presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the 
natural and reasonable effect of their enactments. Their mo-
tives, considered as the moral inducements for their votes, will 
vary with the different members of the legislative body. The 
diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of 
penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, 
precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile.51 
Thus, courts generally view inquiries into the motives behind eminent 
domain actions as off-limits, absent “a clear abuse” of the taking 
power.52 In Deerfield Park District v. Progress Development Corp., for exam-
ple, the property owner argued that the Park District Board had con-
demned its property for use as a park to prevent it from building inte-
grated housing on the site.53 The Illinois Supreme Court’s application 
                                                                                                                      
51 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710–11 (1885). 
52 City of Chi. v. R. Zwick Co., 188 N.E.2d 489, 491 (Ill. 1963) (“[T]he purpose for 
which the power of eminent domain is exercised may be questioned, but in the absence of 
a clear abuse of the power, the motives that prompt the taking are not the subject of judi-
cial investigation.”); see also Indianapolis Water Co. v. Lux, 64 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Ind. 1946) 
(noting trial court cannot consider the motive of the condemning authority in bringing 
the condemnation action); Armory Site in Kan. City v. Aronson, 282 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Mo. 
1955) (“As a general rule the purpose of the condemnation, as distinguished from the 
motive, is a legitimate subject of judicial investigation.”); In re Ely Ave. in N.Y., 111 N.E. 
266, 271 (N.Y. 1916). The court stated: 
 This court has recently held that the courts will not impute to the Legisla-
ture or the discretionary action of municipal bodies clothed with legislative 
powers other than public motives for their acts, that the presumption that leg-
islative action has been devised and adopted on adequate information and 
under the influence of correct motives will be applied to the discretionary ac-
tion of municipal bodies and will preclude all collateral attack, and this rule 
has long been established by decisions of this court. 
Id. (citations omitted). Motive is subject to judicial scrutiny, however, when it merges with 
bad faith, a topic taken up below. See infra Part III.B. 
53 174 N.E.2d 850, 852–53 (Ill. 1961). 
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of the motive/purpose distinction translated into a holding that while it 
was inappropriate for the court to inquire into the motives of the indi-
vidual board members,54 the property owner was entitled to show “that 
the land sought to be taken, [was] sought not for a necessary public 
purpose, but rather for the sole purpose of preventing [the property 
owner] from conducting a lawful business.”55 
 In practice, however, the distinction between motive and purpose 
often blurs because of the difficulty of categorizing legislative actions. 
If the Park District Board in Deerfield Park actually had constructed a 
park at the site, would that mean that the taking was legitimate, even 
if primarily (so long as not solely) motivated by an impermissible goal 
of preventing integrated housing? At least one court would answer 
that question, “yes.” In State ex rel. City of Creve Coeur v. Weinstein, the 
African-American property owners alleged that the city had con-
demned their residential property for a public park and playground 
to prevent them from building a home on the property.56 The court 
refused to examine the motives behind the city’s actions, stating that 
if the land was used for the stated purpose, there was “no doubt” that 
the taking was for a public use.57 While the court did note that the 
property owners could show as a defense to the eminent domain ac-
tion that the land would not be put to the stated use of a public park 
and playground, so long as the park was built, the court was unwilling 
to consider whether the taking was animated by racially discrimina-
tory motives.58 
 At bottom, the distinction between motive and purpose is an artifi-
cial one, and the courts’ response to this issue is a pragmatic one—if 
the condemnor puts the land to the articulated public use, the judicial 
inquiry ceases. The practical effect of the courts’ ineffectual response is 
                                                                                                                      
54 Id. at 855 (stating that the purpose for which the power of eminent domain is exer-
cised is a legitimate subject of judicial inquiry, but “the motives that may have actuated 
those in authority are not the subject of judicial investigation”). 
55 Id. 
56 329 S.W.2d 399, 402–03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). 
57 Id. at 410. 
58 Id. Although Creve Coeur is an older case, it apparently remains good law. See Blaske v. 
Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 835 (Mo. 1991) (citing Creve Coeur for the propo-
sition that “[c]ourts absolutely may not look behind the legislature’s enactment of a statute 
to second guess the process by which the legislature arrived at its conclusion”); see also 
State v. Hutch, 631 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (“Although motivated in part by 
improper considerations, if examination of the facts and circumstances of proposed con-
demnation demonstrates a genuine need and if in fact the condemnor intends to use the 
property for its avowed purpose, the condemnor’s action cannot be arbitrary and capri-
cious.”). 
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to encourage strategic and deceitful behavior by the condemnor. If the 
only restriction is that the condemnor articulate a proper use for the 
taking (even if the use is a subterfuge), and then follow through on 
that articulated use, the judicial inquiry quickly devolves into a variant 
of Justice Scalia’s “stupid staffer” argument in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council 59—even a condemnor with clearly improper motives 
can, with a little effort and forethought, articulate a facially valid pur-
pose for the taking and one which is relatively easy and relatively inex-
pensive to effectuate, such as construction of a park or provision of 
open space. 
 Some courts have recognized the inherent opportunity for legis-
lative gaming here, and have tried to address the issue by examining 
whether the purpose articulated by the condemnor is a real one, or is 
just a sham. This leads the court into convoluted issues of true versus 
stated purpose and raises the ill-defined role of bad faith in takings 
analysis. 
B. Stated Versus True Purpose and the Role of Bad Faith 
 Courts sometimes will inquire, at least to a limited extent, into 
whether the stated purpose of the taking is the true purpose—an in-
quiry that often spills over into evaluations of bad faith on the part of 
the condemnor.60 And, in fact, issues of motive can also be introduced 
through the back-door of bad faith, further muddying already clouded 
waters. In Pennsylvania, for example, the courts have stated that “[b]ad 
faith is generally the opposite of good faith and . . . implies a tainted 
motive of interest” and that “[b]ad faith becomes palpable when such 
motive is obvious or readily perceived.”61 Thus, although the courts in 
                                                                                                                      
59 See 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992). Justice Scalia stated: 
In Justice Blackmun’s view, even with respect to regulations that deprive an 
owner of all developmental or economically beneficial land uses, the test for 
required compensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-
preventing justification for its action. Since such a justification can be formu-
lated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature 
has a stupid staff. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
60 See, e.g., Redev. Auth. of Erie v. Owens, 274 A.2d 244, 247–51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1971). 
61 Id. at 247. Thus, where a redevelopment authority sought to condemn private prop-
erty from one owner “for the sole purpose of obtaining the property in question for the 
benefit” of another private individual, palpable bad faith was present. Id. at 250; see also 
City of Atlanta v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 271 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. 1980) (“‘[B]ad faith’ 
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theory eschew the notion that they can inquire into the motives under-
lying a taking, they in practice, by acknowledging a role for evaluating 
the condemnor’s actions for subterfuge or bad faith, open the door to 
at least limited inquiries about motive.62 
 The real difficulty lies in defining legislative actions that constitute 
bad faith. Some cases are relatively easy—such as where the sovereign 
articulates a valid public purpose for the taking, but the real purpose is 
palpably and demonstrably otherwise.63 In City of Miami v. Wolfe, for ex-
ample, the City of Miami sought to condemn the appellee’s property, 
allegedly for the purpose of extending an existing roadway.64 The prop-
erty owner challenged the condemnation action on the grounds that 
the city’s true purpose was not to acquire the lands for a public street, 
but rather to acquire the title to contiguous bay-bottom land.65 The bay-
bottom land in question was owned by the state in trust and, under state 
statute, could be sold only to the upland riparian owner.66 The court 
found that the record “conclusively indicate[d]” that the city had at-
tempted to condemn the appellee’s land so as to acquire the riparian 
right to purchase contiguous bay-bottom land under the state statute, 
and not to construct a road extension.67 The court thus concluded that 
the condemnation action “was brought in bad faith, amounted to a 
gross abuse of discretion, and should have been dismissed.”68 
 Not all cases present such forthright facts, however, and many 
courts, even in the context of allegations of bad faith, will fall back on 
the rubric that so long as the articulated public purpose is pursued, 
the taking is valid. For example, in In re Real Property in Incorporated 
                                                                                                                      
has been . . . equated with conscious wrongdoing motivated by improper interest or by ill 
will.”). 
62 City of Evansville v. Reising, 547 N.E.2d 1106, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). The court 
stated: 
[A] trial court could properly decide whether a public body is using subter-
fuge and bad faith in seizing a citizen’s property, whether the public body has 
no real intention of applying the property to the public purpose and use al-
leged and to decide whether a public body is acting outside its power and 
scope of authority in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 
Id. 
63 See Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1998) (“Where . . . a condemnation is commenced for an apparently valid public pur-
pose, but the real purpose is otherwise, the condemnation may be set aside.”). 
64 150 So. 2d 489, 489 (Fla. 1963). 
65 Id. at 490. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. This case was not a non-use case. 
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Village of Hewlett Bay Park, the city had proposed to condemn a parcel 
for construction of a city garage and storage facility after the property 
owner had petitioned repeatedly to have the parcel rezoned for con-
struction of a parking lot (a use opposed by many neighboring prop-
erty owners).69 The trial court found that the facts surrounding the 
condemnation suggested that the stated purpose was suspect70 and 
concluded “that the real purpose of this condemnation proceeding in 
larger part is not to use this property for something affirmative, so 
much as it is to prevent its use for something else which the village 
authorities regard as undesirable. Such is a perversion of the con-
demnation process.”71 On appeal, however, the appellate division re-
versed, stating that because there was no proof that the city would not 
use the property for the stated public purpose, “there was no proof of 
‘bad faith’ on the part of the condemnor, either as to whether the 
proposed use is a public one or as to whether there would be adher-
ence to such use after the taking of the property.”72 
 Part of the analytical difficulty in these cases lies in the fact that 
bad faith is a many-nuanced term in the context of eminent domain 
actions in general, and in non-use cases in particular. In defining the 
term in Pheasant Ridge Associates, Ltd. v. Town of Burlington, for exam-
ple, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that bad faith 
“includes the use of the power of eminent domain solely for a reason 
that is not proper, although the stated public purpose or purposes for 
the taking are plainly valid ones” —in short, the court drew a distinc-
                                                                                                                      
69 265 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), rev’d sub nom., Inc. Vill. of Hewlett Bay 
Park v. Klein, 276 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966). The parcel was adjacent to the prop-
erty owner’s shopping center. Id. at 1008. The property owner wanted the parcel rezoned 
from single family residential to commercial uses, so that it could construct a parking lot. 
Id. The need for the parking lot was occasioned by the county widening the road in front 
of the shopping center, causing a loss of parking. Id. 
70 See id. at 1010. The trial court stated: 
The precipitate way in which the village moved to condemn this property, 
without any specific plan for its development, on the eve of the hearing of an 
application by the owner to use it for parking purposes, coupled with its size 
of more than four times the present site, would seem to belie the bona fides of 
the petitioner’s position. 
Id. Moreover, the court noted, it seemed “highly improbable that the village residents who 
[were] so adamantly opposed to” the use of the parcel for parking purposes, would really 
be content with its use as a “storage dump” if that were actually the use to which the village 
intended to put it. Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Klein, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 312. 
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tion between true public purpose and stated (sham) public purpose.73 
Nonetheless, proving bad faith is difficult, and the Pheasant Ridge 
Court stated that it would not impute improper motives to municipal 
officers and voters if “valid reasons that would have supported the 
town’s action” were present.74 
 The Pheasant Ridge court, however, explicitly rejected the notion 
that so long as the articulated public use was pursued, the taking was 
legitimate regardless of the underlying legislative motive.75 The prop-
erty owner in Pheasant Ridge had filed an application for a compre-
hensive permit to develop low- and moderate-income apartments.76 
Acting pursuant to a unanimous vote of a town meeting, the town 
adopted an order to take the land for purposes of parks, recreation, 
and moderate-income housing.77 
 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that it would 
have been improper for the town to take the land solely to block the 
construction of low- or moderate-income housing.78 The court con-
cluded that the “only valid justification” for the taking would be that 
the town truly intended the land be used for the purpose articulated as 
the basis for the taking.79 Yet, the record showed that in recent studies 
of the town’s parks and recreation needs, the town had never identified 
this site or this general area for acquisition, nor had the town ever con-
sidered providing housing in this area prior to the property owner’s 
proposal.80 In fact, the court found that the record as a whole made it 
                                                                                                                      
73 506 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (Mass. 1987). The South Dakota Supreme Court has taken a 
similar stance: “A municipality acts in bad faith when it condemns land for a private 
scheme or for an improper reason, though the superficially stated purpose purports to be 
valid.” City of Freeman v. Salis, 630 N.W.2d 699, 703 (S.D. 2001) (citing Pheasant Ridge, 506 
N.E.2d at 1156); see also Denver W. Metro. Dist. v. Geudner, 786 P.2d 434, 436 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1989) (“If the primary purpose underlying a condemnation decision is to advance 
private interests, the existence of an incidental public benefit does not prevent a court 
from finding ‘bad faith’ and invalidating a condemning authority’s determination that a 
particular acquisition is necessary.”). 
74 Pheasant Ridge, 506 N.E.2d at 1156 (“It is not easy to prove that particular municipal 
action was taken in bad faith.”). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1154. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1156. Nor could the town have taken the property in order to prevent the 
negative impact of the proposed development on water, sewer, or traffic, as the town was 
not barring other residential developments (presumably higher-income housing) on these 
grounds. Id. at 1156–57. While infrastructure impacts might have warranted denial of the 
comprehensive permit, it would not justify a taking, which the court deemed “an indirect 
and unfairly selective attack on the problem.” Id. at 1157. 
79 Id. 
80 Pheasant Ridge, 506 N.E.2d at 1157. 
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clear that the town “was concerned only with blocking the [property 
owner’s] development.”81 Because the attempted condemnation was 
intended to prevent an undesired use, not to pursue an affirmative 
public use, it “was unlawful because [it] was done in bad faith.”82 
 The Georgia Supreme Court, which has probably confronted the 
non-use issue more directly than any other state court, has adopted a 
slightly different definition of bad faith. According to the Georgia Su-
preme Court, “bad faith is neither negligence nor poor judgment, but 
involves conscious wrong-doing and a dishonest intent”—that is, ac-
tions that are tantamount to fraud.83 The court has also stated that: 
“This Court has found bad faith in the determination of public pur-
pose only when the stated purpose was a subterfuge.”84 Yet, it is hard 
to characterize the general rule regarding non-use cases in Georgia 
because of the specialized nature of the cases presented there. 
 The Georgia Supreme Court decided one of the earliest cases to 
take on directly the issue of whether a sovereign can take property for 
non-use purposes—Earth Management, Inc. v. Heard County.85 The pro-
posed private use at issue there was one that often raises the hackles of 
municipalities and neighboring property owners alike: a hazardous 
waste facility. Earth Management, Inc. had done studies and conducted 
investigations for several months with regard to the acquisition of nec-
essary permits to locate a hazardous waste facility on a parcel of prop-
erty on which it held an option.86 Before Earth Management exercised 
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. By contrast, in Town of Chelmsford v. DiBiase, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court found that no bad faith had occurred because the taking decision actually predated 
the unwanted proposed use by the private property owner. 345 N.E.2d 373, 374–75 (Mass. 
1976). The Town of Chelmsford had been considering the acquisition of a forty-eight-acre 
parcel for more than ten years; in part, their interest was generated by the fact that the 
parcel abutted 100 acres of town forest. Id. at 375. Two town meetings were held to vote on 
taking the property for conservation purposes, but the first meeting was adjourned for 
want of a quorum, and the town counsel ruled that the vote taken at the second meeting 
was invalid. Id. at 374. The property owner then submitted an application for a compre-
hensive permit to build low- and moderate-income housing; three weeks later, a town 
meeting was held at which the taking was approved. Id. The judge ruled, in the absence of 
pleadings to the contrary, that the taking was in good faith and for a public benefit and the 
appellate court affirmed. Id. at 376. The bottom line is that these determinations are 
largely fact-specific, and timing of the taking greatly influences the outcome. 
82 Pheasant Ridge, 506 N.E.2d at 1158. 
83 Earth Mgmt., Inc. v. Heard County, 283 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ga. 1981); see City of At-
lanta v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 271 S.E.2d 821, 822 (Ga. 1980) (“The term ‘bad faith’ 
has been used side by side with the word ‘fraud’ in describing those exercises of official 
discretion to condemn lands with which the courts will interfere.”). 
84 City of Marietta v. Edwards, 519 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Ga. 1999). 
85 283 S.E.2d at 456–61. 
86 Id. at 456. 
66 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 35:45 
its option, the county instituted condemnation proceedings to take the 
property for use as a public park.87 Earth Management alleged at trial 
that the county had condemned the property in bad faith and for the 
“sole purpose” of preventing the construction of the hazardous waste 
facility.88 
 As the Georgia Supreme Court put it, the case addressed “the 
point of impact between two vital competing public interests”—the 
right of a property owner to prevent the taking of its property except 
for a public purpose (and with the payment of just compensation), 
and the right of the state to appropriate private property for public 
purpose in the interest of its people.89 The court acknowledged that a 
public park was a public purpose and that the court was not in a posi-
tion to second-guess the county as to the size and scope of a park 
needed for its people.90 The court found, however, that the inquiry 
did not end there: 
The remaining question then is whether the action of the 
county commissioner in condemning this parcel of land was 
taken for the purpose of building a public park or whether 
this was a mere subterfuge utilized in order to veil the real 
purpose of preventing the construction of a hazardous waste 
disposal facility.91 
Here, while no evidence indicated that the condemned land would not 
be put to use as a public park, the evidence also indicated that the “real 
reason for its being taken was to thwart” the use of the property as a 
landfill, a result the court found untenable.92 “There is no law, statu-
tory, constitutional or otherwise, which clothes a governing authority 
with the right to utilize the power of eminent domain in order to re-
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88 Id. at 459. 
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91 Earth Mgmt., 283 S.E.2d at 459–60. 
92 Id. at 460. The court noted that “no other land was ever considered for the public 
park, no on-site surveying, planning, or inspection” was conducted before the condemna-
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strict a legitimate activity in which the state has an interest.”93 Although 
a public park is a legitimate public use, the court found that this land 
was condemned “for the obvious purpose” of preventing the location of 
the hazardous waste facility and “[s]uch action is beyond the power 
conferred upon the county by law and amounts to bad faith.”94 
 The court’s language is interesting in two respects. First, the court 
identified the landfill as a “legitimate activity in which the state has an in-
terest”95—suggesting, perhaps, that were the undesired use not serving a 
general public need, the outcome might have been different. Did the 
social necessity (and traditional public service overtones) of the landfill 
use somehow give this case greater urgency than if the undesired use 
had been a use more traditionally pursued by the private, rather than 
the public, sector (such as a rehabilitation facility)? Second, the court 
seemed concerned that the county was engaging in a subterfuge.96 
Would the court have viewed the condemnation as more legitimate had 
the county been more direct about its legislative objectives? 
 The non-use issue was presented to the Georgia Supreme Court 
again just five years later, in Carroll County v. City of Bremen, and again 
the court described the dispute in terms of competing public inter-
ests.97 The City of Bremen had been negotiating with the property 
owner for “some time” to buy the land for a waste-water facility.98 After 
a new county commissioner took office who opposed the location of 
the facility in Carroll County, the county filed a condemnation action 
to take the land for use as a training area for county police and fire 
employees.99 
 The trial court found that the “true reason” for the condemna-
tion was to prevent construction of the public-sewage treatment 
plant.100 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed, finding that the county 
was acting in bad faith.101 The court stated: “As in Earth Management, 
the use put forth by the county is a public purpose, but there is evi-
dence that the actual purpose was to stop another use, also public, but 
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94 Id. at 461. 
95 Id. at 460 (emphasis added). 
96 Id. 
97 347 S.E.2d 598, 599 (Ga. 1986). 
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99 Id. 
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101 Id. (“This use of the condemnation process by a county is not within its power and 
amounts to acting in bad faith.”). 
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one which the county officers oppose.”102 Although the “general rule” 
is that “a court will not substitute its judgment for that of a condemn-
ing authority in determining the need for a taking or the type of in-
terest to be taken,” and although the court acknowledged its “reluc-
tance . . . to find bad faith in determining public purpose and thereby 
overturn the condemnor’s authority to condemn,” the Georgia Su-
preme Court found that it was “improper” for the county to use its 
eminent domain power to block the sewage plant when other, legiti-
mate efforts to block the plant had failed.103 
 What is interesting—and perhaps unique—about Earth Manage-
ment and Carroll County is that they both involved undesired uses with 
strong public services overtones. In Carroll County, the sewage treat-
ment plant actually was to be constructed and run by the City of Bre-
men.104 While the hazardous waste facility in Earth Management was to 
be constructed and run by a private entity,105 the land use is of the 
type that is typically both heavily regulated and essential to modern 
society—not unlike a traditional sanitary landfill writ large. It may be 
that these cases can be explained more in terms of a paramount state 
public interest trumping a weaker local public interest than in terms 
of outright judicial rejection of non-use takings. 
 We can only speculate on that point, however, because when we 
look at subsequent non-use cases where the public nature of the unde-
sired use was weaker, we find the courts have not explicitly drawn such 
a distinction. In Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, 
for example, the borough brought a condemnation action to acquire a 
12.5-acre parcel, purportedly for public park purposes.106 The owner, 
the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, challenged the condemnation 
on the grounds that the borough’s stated public use was a mere pretext 
to exclude Kessler and its rehabilitation facility from the community.107 
 The facts showed that, prior to Kessler’s purchase of the parcel, 
the borough had been “actively soliciting residential developers to 
acquire” the parcel for construction of single-family residences.108 Af-
ter Kessler contracted to purchase the property, it applied for a condi-
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tional use permit for its rehabilitation facility.109 Once community re-
sistance to the Kessler plan became clear, the borough hired a planner 
and a land use attorney to evaluate the “suitability of the site” for the 
proposed use.110 Both concluded that the proposed use was consistent 
with the community’s master plan and zoning ordinances.111 After a 
citizens’ organization was formed to oppose the use, the borough 
conducted a survey, which revealed that a majority of the residents 
were willing to pay extra taxes to purchase the property for park 
uses.112 The borough passed a resolution stating that “it was in the 
public interest to acquire [the parcel] for public use as park land and 
recreational use.”113 The borough started a condemnation action, and 
Kessler filed suit, challenging the condemnation.114 
 The New Jersey Superior Court stated that because it is the legis-
lature’s prerogative to determine what is a public use, a presumption 
of validity and “great deference” attaches to a municipality’s exercise 
of its eminent domain power.115 The court added that “[c]ourts will 
generally not inquire into a public body’s motive concerning the ne-
cessity of the taking . . . .”116 However, the Essex Fells court went on to 
note that the condemnation will “not be enforced where there has 
been a showing of ‘improper motives, bad faith, or some other con-
sideration amounting to a manifest abuse of the power of eminent 
domain.’”117 
 The court clarified that even if the articulated public purpose 
falls within the realm of valid public uses, if the “true reason” for the 
taking is ultra vires, the court may strike down the condemnation.118 In 
short, the court concluded, “public bodies may condemn for an au-
thorized purpose but may not condemn to disguise an ulterior mo-
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110 Id. at 859. 
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112 Essex Fells, 673 A.2d at 859. 
113 Id. at 859–60. 
114 Id. at 860. 
115 Id. 
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117 Id. (quoting Tenn. Gas Transmission Co. v. Hirschfield, 120 A.2d 886, 887 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1956)). The court stated: “Bad faith generally implies the doing of an act 
for a dishonest purpose. The term also ‘contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operat-
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lon, Inc. v. Prutscher, 428 A.2d 518, 526 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)). 
118 Essex Fells, 673 A.2d at 860–61. 
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tive.”119 Although the Essex Fells court could find no relevant New Jer-
sey cases involving bad faith challenges to condemnations, it stated 
that cases from other jurisdictions “make it clear that where a con-
demnation is commenced for an apparently valid, stated purpose but 
the real purpose is to prevent a proposed development which is con-
sidered undesirable, the condemnation may be set aside.”120 
 Certainly, the evidence here indicated that the borough was not 
condemning to satisfy “the public need” for a park, but rather to ad-
dress community opposition to Kessler’s proposed use.121 The bor-
ough never considered purchasing the land until the public opposi-
tion occurred, and evidence suggested borough officials were more 
interested in controlling who acquired the property than in obtaining 
open space for its residents.122 Ultimately, the court found that the 
condemnation action was brought in bad faith to block a rehabilita-
tion facility that the residents opposed, and so was invalid.123 
 The Essex Falls decision is interesting on several accounts. First, 
there was no subterfuge involved—the borough council was very open 
about the proposed taking and its opposition to the property owner’s 
proposed use of the parcel.124 While using the land as a park might 
have been a secondary purpose for the taking (the first clearly being 
preventing the facility opposed by its residents), there was no evi-
dence that the property would not be put to use as a public park.125 
Essex Fells is, in this respect, analogous to State ex rel. City of Creve Coeur 
v. Weinstein and In re Real Property in Incorporated Village of Hewlett Bay 
                                                                                                                      
119 Id.; see also City of Rapid City v. Finn, 668 N.W.2d 324, 327 (S.D. 2003) (“This court 
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Carroll County v. City of Bremen, 347 S.E.2d 598 (Ga. 1986); Earth Mgt., Inc. v. Heard 
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1152 (Mass. 1987); In re Real Property in Inc. Vill. of Hewlett Bay Park, 265 N.Y.S.2d 1006 
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122 Id. at 861–62. 
123 Id. at 863 (“The power of eminent domain cannot be justified when used in re-
sponse to public opinion against a proposed land use.”). 
124 Id. at 862. 
125 See id. 
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Park, where the courts found the taking to be valid, yet the Essex Fells 
court reached a very different result.126 
 Second, the court stated that this was a bad faith taking, and yet it 
never explained why the borough’s actions were tainted.127 Certainly, 
the taxpayers and voters, and even the property owner, were not being 
misled in any way as to what was going on—the borough surveyed the 
residents and found that they were prepared to pay additional taxes to 
acquire the property for recreational purposes to avoid Kessler’s pro-
posed use.128 
 It may be that the real source of the court’s discomfort is that the 
borough was using its eminent domain power to accomplish indirectly 
what it could not do directly through the police power. The borough’s 
own planning and legal consultants had determined the proposed 
private use was consistent with the master plan and zoning ordi-
nances—and had indicated that a conditional use permit should is-
sue.129 Under the police power, the borough could not completely 
ban the use from its borders, although it could regulate specific facets 
of the use, such as the location and operation.130 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court looked at this issue again in 2006, 
in Mount Laurel Township v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C., with a very different 
outcome.131 The township had condemned a 16.3-acre parcel owned by 
a developer, MiPro Homes, which was zoned for residential uses.132 The 
trial court had found that while the township had articulated a facially 
valid purpose for the taking—provision of open space—its real purpose 
in condemning the land was to prevent development of another resi-
dential subdivision in what was already a heavily developed township.133 
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The trial court had concluded that, while the township could prevent 
residential development and preserve open space by engaging in a vol-
untary purchase from the property owners, it was prohibited from us-
ing the power of eminent domain to acquire the property.134 
 The appellate court reversed, stating that even if the township’s 
“primary goal” was to impede or slow residential development, “this 
does not provide a foundation for finding that the municipality’s use 
of eminent domain for this purpose constitutes fraud, bad faith or 
manifest abuse.”135 The appellate court specifically distinguished 
Mount Laurel Township from Essex Fells, stating that in Essex Fells, the 
property owner’s proposed use of its property implicated a “signifi-
cant public interest[]” (a rehabilitation and nursing facility) and that 
the municipality had abused its power in trying to prevent that use.136 
The appellate court indicated that “a development of single-family 
homes that will be affordable only to upper-income families would 
not serve a comparable public interest.”137 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a brief 
opinion, finding that “the citizens of New Jersey have expressed a 
strong and sustained public interest in the acquisition and preserva-
tion of open space,” and that the township’s motivation in condemn-
ing the property was “not inconsistent with the motive driving the 
public interest in open space acquisition generally.”138 Justice Rivera-
Soto, writing in dissent, argued that the majority had erred in allow-
ing the appellate court’s judgment regarding the social worth (or lack 
thereof) of MiPro’s development plans to sway the outcome.139 In his 
view, “a judge’s individualized and idiosyncratic view of what is or is 
not socially redeeming has no place in determining whether the sov-
ereign’s exercise of the power of eminent domain is proper.”140 
 When we step back and look at the non-use cases decided to date, 
it is hard to find consistent patterns or rules among them. The courts 
have essentially stated that in evaluating these cases, they will not look 
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to the condemnor’s motives, only to its purpose.141 However, the 
courts will look to see if the stated purpose is the true purpose, and 
further, they will look to motive to the extent that it shows bad faith 
on the part of the condemnor.142 At this point, of course, the analysis 
becomes circular—bad faith can be evidenced by tainted motive, and 
yet the courts claim they do not examine motives in takings cases. 
 It is small wonder, then, that the existing case law is in disarray, 
and that it is so difficult to draw clear and easily applied rules from 
the existing jurisprudence on the appropriateness of condemning to 
prevent undesired uses. Rather than attempting to bring order to 
what is clearly chaos in the case law, it is more productive to step back 
and consider what the rule should be. Why can the municipality not 
decide that the public is best served by a condemnation designed to 
prevent an undesired use—by a non-use taking—provided the mu-
nicipality is willing to pay the bill for its decision in the form of just 
compensation for the property taken?143 Might not private property 
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wishes or best interests of the public as a whole—provided always, of course, that the con-
demnation is accompanied by just compensation and is conducted in an open and forth-
right manner. 
There are, of course, problems with this approach. Few issues in the takings law area 
are clear-cut, and trade-offs are inherent. Society does need landfills, sewage-treatment 
plants, rehabilitation facilities, and other uses that neighbors may find undesirable, and 
those uses must be located somewhere—and they will be. At a practical level, at some 
point, the proponent of the undesired use will find either a community that welcomes the 
tax dollars, jobs, or other economic benefits associated with the use, or a community that 
opposes the use but is too poor to buy the use out. The second outcome, of course, is the 
troublesome one from an economic justice viewpoint because it may well lead to wealthier 
communities displacing undesired uses onto poorer communities. However, at the most 
fundamental level, state and federal constitutional provisions protect against improper and 
illegal discrimination, such as exclusion of racial minorities. Moreover, there is a limit as to 
how often any given municipality could condemn for non-use purposes. Fiscal realities 
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rights and the public be better served by permitting an open and hon-
est taking, accompanied by just compensation and full disclosure in 
the public arena, to prevent an undesired use? I address this topic in 
the concluding Part.144 
IV. Rethinking Non-Use Takings 
 When we step back to consider what the rules regarding non-use 
takings should be, as opposed to what they are, some basic contours 
quickly emerge. A municipality’s efforts to condemn for a non-use 
should be stopped if: (1) the municipality runs afoul of statutory or 
state constitutional limits (for example, the municipality is empowered 
to condemn only for certain limited purposes, such as roads or schools, 
and the condemnation does not fall within the specified boundaries); 
(2) the municipality runs into a federal constitutional limit, such as 
equal protection (for example, the municipality is condemning the 
property to prevent the construction of racially integrated housing); or 
(3) the municipality hides its true intent, thereby acting in bad faith, 
and subverting the political process and denying accountability to vot-
ers. 
 The first two categories do not cause much concern, as the rules 
there are straight-forward and easy enough to apply, and the results 
uncontroversial—the municipality has exceeded its statutory or con-
stitutional authority, and its actions must be set aside by the courts. It 
is the third category—the one that raises convoluted issues of motives 
versus purpose, true versus stated purposes, and bad faith—that 
causes the disjointed and often inconsistent outcomes that permeate 
the current case law on non-use takings. Issues of bad faith, motive, 
and purpose are already areas of eminent domain law fraught with 
inconsistent and incomplete analysis and murky relationships. It is 
small wonder, then, that infusing these issues into non-use cases sim-
ply serves to further confuse the analysis rather than illuminate it. 
 The analysis in non-use cases would be greatly simplified and 
clarified if these amorphous and ephemeral concepts simply were 
swept away. Discussions of bad faith, motive, and purpose not only beg 
                                                                                                                      
being what they are, at some point even the wealthiest community will run out of funds to 
buy out every noxious use to which it objects; rather, municipalities will be forced to priori-
tize their decisionmaking in this area. In addition, economic markets, which influence 
siting and allocation of property uses in all other manners, likely resolve many of the con-
flicts in the non-use context as well before they ever arise. And in the end, state legislatures 
could create rules mandating that each community take its fair share of undesirable uses. 
144 See infra Part IV. 
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the question, but they induce and encourage manipulative and de-
ceptive behavior by municipalities. The non-use cases suggest an un-
derlying assumption by condemnors and courts alike that it is not 
permissible to take property for a non-use. As a result, municipalities 
tend to hide their true intent by articulating sham reasons for their 
condemnation— “we suddenly realize we need a park and we need it 
right here, where this landfill, low-income housing, [fill in the undesired 
use of your choosing], is proposed!” When courts then look at the un-
derlying facts and see what is really going on, they may call the mu-
nicipalities on their less-than-forthright behavior, by labeling the be-
havior as bad faith and setting it aside. Or, worse, the courts may hide 
behind the flimsy cloak of motive versus purpose and refuse to ad-
dress a situation that to outsiders goes beyond smelling fishy to stink-
ing to high heaven. When the courts engage in this kind of selective 
vision, they do little to promote public confidence in the fairness of 
the constitutional constraints upon the eminent domain power or 
public respect for the power and integrity of the judiciary. 
 Condemning authorities feel compelled to hide their true moti-
vations because they, and the courts, feel that taking for non-use pur-
poses is inherently wrong. But why? What is wrong with taking for a 
non-use, so long as the goal is to benefit the public generally by pre-
venting the undesired use, and not simply to confer private benefit 
upon a few vocal neighbors? Suppose the law were simply to require 
the actors to be direct about what they were achieving. Go back to the 
opening hypothetical, where the municipality has condemned land, 
ostensibly for park purposes, in order to prevent a large-scale devel-
opment from going forward. What if the municipality had been hon-
est and had just stated: “We don’t want this development. We think 
that it will have deleterious effects on our community, because of en-
vironmental impacts, noise, and traffic issues, and stigmatizing effects 
on neighboring property values. But, we also recognize that such a 
development provides substantial societal benefits, and that the bene-
fits in this instance are not outweighed by the potential harms. Thus, 
we recognize we cannot ban the use under the police power—that 
would be a de facto taking. So, fine, we will instead make it an actual 
taking and provide you, the property owner, with the just compensa-
tion the Constitution demands. In return, the public will receive the 
property for use as a park, open space, or whatever other public use 
we deem appropriate.” This direct approach gets rid of the clutter of 
bad faith, the confusion between motive versus purpose, and the judi-
cial second-guessing that drawing such distinctions necessitates. 
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 The real concern here is not that condemnors may engage in 
non-use takings, but rather that when sovereigns do not openly and 
honestly discuss the motives behind their actions, they subvert the po-
litical process—they prevent open public discussion and dissension 
about the legislative acts, and they obliterate the opportunity for the 
public to voice its pleasure or displeasure about the sovereign’s ac-
tions, either in open public debate or through the ballot box. Where 
the stated purpose for the taking is a subterfuge or a sham, there is a 
breakdown in the political process because there is no way for the 
public to evaluate the actions of the municipality or to react. Where 
the municipality is honest in stating its purpose, however, public de-
bate and opportunity for response are fostered. 
 Moreover, that public debate can itself offer substantial protec-
tion for private property rights, as the firestorm of negative reaction 
to Kelo v. City of New London and the resulting legislative efforts to 
overturn its effects on a state-by-state level indicates.145 Fundamentally, 
a legal rule that would permit municipalities to openly condemn to 
prevent an undesired use from going forward is considerably less wor-
risome than a legal rule, such as we currently have, that encourages 
municipalities to dissemble or even be outright dishonest in pursuing 
their legislative goals. In this instance, honesty is not only the best pol-
icy, but it is critical to ensuring proper protection of private property 
rights and preservation of constitutional integrity. 
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